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STEVEN ALAN SAMSON:  E PLURIBUS UNUM? 
Presented at Virginia State University, November 10, 2006 
 In the mid-nineteenth century, a German immigrant who launched the first 
American encyclopedia and who called himself a “publicist,” laid the groundwork 
for a systematic political science.  Francis Lieber wrote treatises on political 
ethics, political and legal hermeneutics, political economy, and the sources of 
civil liberty.  He is best remembered for his codification of the rules of warfare 
that laid the foundation of the later Hague and Geneva Conventions.  
  Lieber introduced the concept of the nation-state into the English 
language, one of many Lieberisms we still use.  But he also contrasted the 
national polity – that is, one nation for all – with what he called “centralism.” 
Centralism may be intensely national, even to bigotry; it may become a 
political fanaticism [meaning an ideology like communism or 
Rousseauism]; it may be intelligent and formulated with great precision 
[such as the regime of Louis Napoleon]; but centralism remains an inferior 
species of government. . . . [D]ecentralization [by which Lieber explicitly 
meant “interdependence”] becomes necessary as self-government or 
liberty are longed for. . . . 
 
Lieber went on to outline how England – “with unbarred national 
intercommunication” – developed as a national polity long before the rest of 
Europe did and noted how England remained the least centralized state.  
Lieber’s historical treatment of this matter may be instructive here as a reminder 
that “those large communities, which we call nations, formed on the continent of 
Europe out of the fragmentary people left by the disintegration of the Roman 
empire.”  Each was an amalgam of many.  Can that be accomplished today 
without “ethnic cleansing?” 
 Lieber’s account of the circumstances that preceded the long and very 
slow emergence of nation-states appears to be a fair description as well of the 
more recent ebbing tide of dynastic and colonial empires.  Some of the legacies 
of these dead empires, though not nearly enough of them, have begun to 
stabilize; some, like Singapore, even thrive.  Too many have not.  But Lieber was 
not pessimistic, even though he foresaw the challenge of totalitarianism, a form 
of centralism he styled “democratic despotism,” noting that in the Second Empire 
“the advance of knowledge and intelligence gives to despotism a brilliancy, and 
the necessity of peace for exchange give it a facility to establish itself which it 
never possessed before.”  Is this perhaps descriptive of the future of China?   
In his 1868 essay on “Nationalism and Internationalism,” Lieber 
summarized “the three main principles which mark the modern epoch.” 
 The national polity. 
The general endeavor to define more clearly, and to extend more 
widely, human rights and civil liberty. 
And the decree which has gone forth that many leading nations shall 
flourish at one and the same time, plainly distinguished from one 
another, yet striving together, with one public opinion, under the 
protection of one law of nations, and in the bonds of one common 
moving civilization. 
  
Indeed, he believed “the multiplicity of civilized nations, their distinct 
independence (without which there would be enslaving Universal Monarchy), and 
their increasing resemblance and agreement, are some of the great safeguards 
of our civilization.”  This suggests Aristotle’s mixed regime on a large scale. 
While Lieber’s description may sound naïve in light of some of the 
tragedies of the century that followed, his characterization of the principles of the 
Anglo-American tradition “of civil liberty and self-government,” especially in his 
book of that title, merits careful review and application.  A good summary of this 
tradition may be found in the Principles of the Portland Declaration of 1981 set 
down by Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, who noted in point twelve that “the state has 
an ‘annexationist’ character tending toward centralization and the development of 
a Provider State.  We must uphold the principle of subsidiarity” [that is, a plurality 
of autonomous governing institutions].  
Here let us look at another writer in the Burkean tradition who suggests 
how the seeds of what Lieber called “institutional liberty” may be planted, 
nurtured, and protected.  Roger Scruton has devoted much of his work – 
academic, political, and entrepreneurial – to this enterprise.  In The West and the 
Rest
[It] is neither Western civilization, nor Christianity, nor global capitalism, 
nor anything else that can be given an abstract profile. . . . In an uncanny 
way, the Islamists have identified the core component of the system that 
they wish to destroy.  It is not the American people who are the enemy.  It 
is the American state, conceived as an autonomous agent acting freely on 
the stage of international politics, and so calling on itself the wrath of God.  
When Khomeini described America as “the Great Satan” he meant it 
literally.  And his doing so showed that he grasped the fundamental 
difference between the West and the rest: namely, that in the West, but 
not in the rest, there is a political process generating corporate agency, 
collective responsibility, and moral personality in the state. . . .  
, Scruton focuses on the profound differences that separate what he calls 
the “personal state” based on Roman law (i.e., the West) from the essentially 
private space so many others inhabit without the protection of mediating 
institutions.  Commenting on the motivation for the 9-11 attacks, Scruton 
identified the attacks’ principal target in terms that Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau 
would have well understood: 
 
[A] nation-state . . . is a moral and legal person, which acts on its own 
behalf and is liable for what it does.  The nation-state can therefore be 
praised and blamed, hated and loved, and the form of membership that it 
offers is also a bond of trust between individual citizens and the 
corporation in whose decision-making they share. 
 
Scruton refers to it as “the personal State.”  Citizens are joint members of a 
political corporation who enjoy limited liability protections and are thius freed and 
even encouraged to become entrepreneurs. 
The difference between the citizen of a personal state and the resident of 
a legal fiction like Iraq, or Somalia, or so North Korea calls to mind the ancient 
Athenian distinction between the citizen as the creature of the city-state and the 
essentially private individual, who is left naked to his enemies.  As Pericles put it 
in the Funeral Oration, the Athenian who takes no interest in politics is not a man 
who minds his own business – “we say that he has no business here at all.” 
 Scruton observes that citizens of personal states are clothed in their 
rights, they consent to being governed rather than ruled, they enjoy the 
protections of a system based on the rule of law.  These are some of the 
ingredients of a potent and highly productive mixture but they require institutional 
safeguards: 
In the absence of corporate personality, experiments in democratic 
government lead to social disruption, factionalism, and either the tyranny 
of the majority or the seizure of power by a clique. . . . [W]ithout the 
framework of institutions and the underlying territorial loyalty, 
democratization is merely a staging post on the way to tyranny. 
  
Indeed, without them we have the Hobbesian “state of nature.”  The instability of 
much of the developing world generally calls mind, often brutally, the J-curve 
theory of political violence.  As summarized by James C. Davies:  
The crucial factor [that predicts violence] is the vague or specific fear that 
ground gained over a long period of time will be quickly lost.  This fear 
does not generate if there is continued opportunity to satisfy continually 
emerging needs; it generates when the existing government suppresses 
or is blamed for suppressing such opportunity. 
 
How to change that perception or that reality – the absence of the rule of law – is 
an issue that demands attention. 
  In his essay on “The Need for Nations,” Scruton issues a challenge to both 
the West and the rest of the world: 
Never in the history of the world have there been so many migrants.  And 
almost all of them are migrating from regions where nationality is weak or 
non-existent to the established nation states of the West. . . . [F]ew of 
them identify their loyalties in national terms and almost none of them in 
terms of the nations where they settle.  They are migrating in search of 
citizenship – which is the principle gift of national jurisdictions, and the 
origin of the peace, law, stability, and prosperity that still prevail in the 
West. 
 
Citizenship is the relation that arises between the State and the individual 
when each is fully accountable to the other.  It consists in a web of 
reciprocal rights and duties, upheld by a rule of law which stands higher 
than either party.  Although the State enforces that law, it enforces it 
equally against itself and against the private citizen.  The citizen has rights 
which the State is duty-bound to uphold, and also duties which the State 
has a right to enforce. 
 
Roger Scruton’s final sentence here both echoes and refutes Roger 
Taney’s defective understanding of the Constitution expressed in the Dred Scott 
case.  The Civil Rights movement sought to repair a misrepresentation that had 
been long embedded in the national culture, one of the many varieties of what 
Frederic Bastiat called “legal plunder:” that is, the use of the law to “sanctify 
injustice,” making lawful what is commonly regarded as “corruption.”  Too often it 
is the absence of institutional liberty and the unchecked flourishing of legal 
plunder that account for the struggles, conflicts, and migrations that trouble the 
whole world.  To illustrate: Hernando de Soto and his associates conducted a 
revealing study the legal and other obstacles to setting up a business enterprise 
in a number of developing countries.   
Scruton’s point about the plight of migrants has present applications to the 
ongoing immigration debate here but it also rings with ancient controversies – 
recorded in the Bible, The Oresteia, the Melian debate – over the mistreatment, 
indeed the scapegoating of strangers, dissenters, and others who are different.  
René Girard has provided much insight into such behavior through his ideas 
about mimetic rivalry. 
Concerning these migrants, including those who riot in the suburbs of 
Paris, people may object to Scruton’s analysis by saying that, no, they are 
seeking opportunity, gainful employment, a means to stave off hunger or to 
escape turmoil.   I imagine he would reply that these are only the particulars, the 
incidentals of the larger problem.  What the migrants and their neighbors lack 
where they reside is the kind of life that is made possible through an institutional 
liberty nurtured within a territorial state that protects their property, that enables 
them to capitalize their assets and enjoy the fruits of citizenship in a thriving 
community.  What they need, desire, and demand then is to have a home where 
their heart resides.  Yet this is exactly what the West too often takes for granted: 
Every citizen becomes linked to every other, by relations that are financial, 
legal, and fiduciary, but which presuppose no personal tie.  A society of 
citizens can be a society of strangers, all enjoying sovereignty over their 
own lives, and pursuing their individual goals and satisfactions.  They are 
societies in which you form common cause with strangers, and which all of 
you, in those matters on which your common destiny depends, can with 
conviction say ‘we.’ 
 
The nation-state – as opposed to its rivals – offers an opportunity to 
reconcile the old dilemma of unity vs. diversity.  This interplay of individuals, this 
synergy of forces, this weaving of one fabric out of many threads, has given the 
West its vitality and cohesion.   The prevailing American notion of the nation-
state is inclusive.  All generations, kindred [gentes], and genders are welcome to 
contribute.  No one is excluded.  As David Landes puts it: “Literate mothers 
matter.”  But Pierre Manent warns that the West risks forfeiting its advantage 
through the erosion of its political forms, institutions, and families through 
globalization and democratization: 
commerce [binding individuals rather than citizens], right [allowing judges 
to rule directly in the name of humanity], morality [detached from its social 
framework]: these are the three systems, the three empires that promise 
to exit from the political.   
 
In other words, political discussion yields priority to managerial techniques – rule 
by administrative mandarins who are not accountable to the political process.  
Each in its own form: commerce, according to the realism, the prosaic 
character of interests rightly understood; right, according to the intellectual 
coherence of a network of rights rigorously deduced from individual 
autonomy; and finally, morality, according to the sublime aim of pure 
human dignity to which one is joined by the purely spiritual sentiment of 
respect. 
 
Liberty, commerce, rights, and morality have thus become detached from 
their roots in Biblical ethics.  Roger Scruton similarly characterizes this highly 
individualistic and irresponsible “morality” as a “culture of repudiation.”  Often it is 
the elite classes that repudiate the common core of values.  This will only make 
the assimilation of migrants more complicated.  For Kenneth Minogue, any “exit 
from the political” in the form of an abstract and poorly delimited “political 
moralism” is an entrance into the despotic.  Let us hope instead that Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America can develop Lieber’s “multiplicity of civilized nations” even as 
so many Europeans strive to repudiate theirs. 
For Francis Lieber one of the two distinct facts that distinguish modern 
civilization from antiquity is “the recuperative energy of modern states.”  Today it 
is evident that this statement must be qualified.  Modern civilization can recover 
only to the degree that it can tap into the fiduciary reservoir of power: the consent 
of the governed.  Personal states must somehow work together and address the 
issues of the day, binding people together while preserving their rich diversity, or 
global institutions will continue to fail to work as originally envisioned.   
As Edmund Burke noted: "Society is indeed a contract . . . it becomes a 
partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are 
living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born."  Here let us conclude 
with an observation by the great French poet and essayist, Paul Valéry: 
Power has only the force we are willing to attribute to it; even the most 
brutal power is founded on belief.  We credit it with the ability to act at all 
times and everywhere, whereas, in reality, it can only act at one point and 
at a certain moment.  In short, all power is exactly in the position of a bank 
whose existence depends on the sole probability (incidentally, very great) 
that all its clients will not come at once to draw out their deposits.  If, either 
constantly or at any particular moment, a certain power were summoned 
to bear its real force at every point in its empire, its strength at each point 
would be about equal to zero. . . .  
